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Regulators’ efforts to shape business responses to climate change centre on the development of CO2 
markets. These are designed to deliver significant CO2 emission reductions at the lowest possible 
cost to industry. However, the potential of these mechanisms is not currently being realised. Research 
conducted by Dr Gareth Veal (University of Bath), with colleagues at the University of Bath and 
Lancaster University, explores the problems with the current design of CO2 markets. 
The research recommends that CO2 emission regulation places more focus on the urgency of climate 
change mitigation, and provides businesses with the regulatory certainty and incentive to realign their 
operational and investment priorities. This could be done through simpler forms of regulation, such 
as taxes or mandates, and by placing responsibility for compliance and reporting with the CEO.
The findings are based upon case studies, which examine the operation of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.
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POLICY BRIEF
About this research
Research findings in context: problems with 
the design of CO2 markets
The role of business in mitigating climate change 
represents both an important opportunity, and a 
significant challenge for industry. The Confederation of 
British Industry estimates that a £200bn investment in 
energy infrastructure will be required to meet the UK’s 
target for a 34% cut in CO2 emissions by 2020. CO2 
markets have been selected as the primary mechanism 
by which to regulate the business response to climate 
change, because they offer the potential to deliver 
CO2 emission reductions at the lowest possible cost 
to industry. 
Figure 1 illustrates the ‘make’ or ‘buy’ decision which 
is at the heart of the capital efficiency of CO2 markets. 
This mechanism is designed to allow the cheapest CO2 
reductions to be targeted first and then redistributed 
via the CO2 market. The top facility in the diagram faces 
cheap options for reducing their CO2 emissions and 
therefore ‘makes’ the required CO2 savings in-house. 
Surplus reductions are then sold via the CO2 market to 
the second facility, which faces expensive options for in-
house reductions and therefore follows the ‘buy’ option.
Key findings
Barriers to the operation of CO2 markets
The research highlights a number of 
discrepancies between the design of CO2 
markets and their actual operation. These 
undermine the ‘make’ or ‘buy’ decision at the 
heart of CO2 markets, which is meant to drive 
cost effective reductions in business’s  
CO2 emissions.  
•	 CO2 costs are not significant: CO2 
costs can represent as little as 1% of a 
company’s energy expenditure, too little 
to influence business behaviour. 
•	 Businesses respond to CO2 markets 
as a compliance exercise, rather than 
as a market opportunity: Businesses 
often do not understand the design or 
purpose of CO2 markets. As a result they 
do not actively engage in CO2 trading 
and instead manage their response to 
CO2 markets as an exercise in regulatory 
compliance. 
•	 Uncertainty blocks action: CO2 markets 
do not give a fixed price for CO2 in the 
long-term that is easy to incorporate 
into investment decisions. Furthermore, 
their existence is only guaranteed in the 
short to medium term. Businesses require 
certainty in the long-term if they are to 
be persuaded to make climate-friendly 
investments within capital projects that 
have lifetimes spanning decades.  
•	 Time is more important than cost 
effectiveness: The emphasis of CO2 
market design on capital efficiency should 
be relaxed, instead prioritising urgency 
as the primary design criterion for climate 
regulation. This would acknowledge the 
narrow window of opportunity for climate 
change mitigation, the long lifetimes of 
large capital projects, and the rising costs 
of future adaptation due to delays in 
climate mitigation efforts now.
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Option 2: ‘Buy’ CO2 savings from market
(facilities with expensive CO2  reduction options)
Sell CO2 saved beyond 
target reduction
Buy CO2 to meet shortfall
Option 1: ‘Make’ CO2 savings in-house
(facilities with cheap CO2  reduction options)
Figure 1: CO2 markets: capital efficiency via the 
‘Make’ or ‘Buy’ decision
CO2 market
However, the findings of recent in-depth research by 
Dr Veal (University of Bath) and others shows that the 
‘make’ or ‘buy’ mechanism is failing during the actual 
operation of CO2 markets. CO2 markets are therefore 
not delivering the CO2 savings anticipated, and their 
capital efficiency is compromised. 
To understand why CO2 markets such as the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme are struggling 
to influence the actual behaviour of businesses, 
the researchers develop explanations of the 
discrepancies between CO2 market design and 
operation. They show first that regulators (in this case 
The Environment Agency) and businesses perceive 
the purpose of, and potential for, CO2 markets in very 
different ways. For regulators, CO2 reduction was 
seen as a strategic concern for UK-wide industry, 
incentivised by an absolute price for CO2. In contrast, 
individual businesses measured CO2 costs relative 
to other expenditures, and in some cases CO2 
costs amounted to less than 1% of annual energy 
expenditure. This low cost of CO2 led businesses to 
describe their engagement with CO2 markets as an 
exercise in compliance: a threat to their production 
processes and product quality which they needed to 
manage, rather than an opportunity to exploit. 
Given these differences in the perceived purpose 
and potential of CO2 markets, the research shows 
that certain technical, temporal and uncertainty-
based issues with CO2 reduction have been ignored 
by regulators in the design of CO2 markets. The 
actual operation of this market does not adequately 
challenge participating businesses to change their 
operational decision-making or longer-term capital 
investments. Specifically, the design of the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme does not adequately 
challenge technological reliance on CO2-intensive 
production; nor does it acknowledge that businesses 
are locked into capital investment projects which may 
be incompatible with reductions in CO2 emissions 
within the required timescales; nor, finally, does it 
provide the certainty that businesses need about how 
the CO2 market will work in the future, in order to plan 
their engagement with it. 
As such, the research raises doubts about the 
ability of CO2 markets, in their current form, to 
mitigate climate change, and makes a number of 
recommendations for the better regulation of 
CO2 emissions. 
Recommendations for policy makers: 
considerations for future climate regulation
The research will assist regulators who aim to 
improve the efficacy of market-based efforts to 
reduce CO2 emissions. By enabling better regulation, 
the research will also help UK industry capitalise upon 
opportunities to reduce their energy costs and 
CO2 emissions, and help to meet the UK’s CO2 
reduction targets. 
The main policy recommendations concern the 
design of CO2 emission regulation (more focus 
on certainty, urgency and the on-going review 
of evidence), and how to engage and incentivise 
businesses (placing responsibility for compliance 
with climate regulation with senior management, and 
supporting businesses in realigning their priorities). 
Certainty and urgency: 
There is a 20-30 year window of opportunity for 
climate change mitigation. A period often shorter than 
the lifespan of current capital investments This means 
that decisions taken today will significantly influence 
the success of climate change mitigation efforts in 
the future. The researchers recommend that 
regulators should:
• Give at least 30 years of regulatory certainty to 
 match climate change mitigation timescales and
 the lifetime of large capital investments.
• Acknowledge that the costs resulting from 
 inaction significantly outweigh the costs of action 
 to mitigate climate change, and refocus climate 
 policy to prioritise urgency ahead of capital 
 efficiency.
• Use simpler forms of regulation, such as taxes or 
 mandates.
Policy guidance:
An independent authority should be formed with 
responsibility for reviewing climate science and 
advising government on target setting and climate 
policy. 
Point of regulatory intervention:
Responsibility for compliance with climate regulation 
should be shifted away from local managers at 
individual sites, and placed (along with a potential 
criminal liability) with the CEO. 
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Organisational focus and readiness:
Help businesses to focus upon the end goal of 
reducing CO2 emissions (rather than managing their 
participation with CO2 markets) by making the means 
of regulatory compliance straightforward and easy to 
understand. This supports the case for using simpler 
policies such as taxes or mandates. 
• Require every organisation to name a board 
 member with responsibility for climate change 
 mitigation. 
• Ensure that regulations present incentives which 
 are substantial when compared to other 
 operational costs.
• Require all organisations to make their plans for 
 climate change mitigation publicly available, 
 reporting progress against their targets on an 
 annual basis.
Methodology
This research was conducted between January 2009 
and May 2010, and employs the case study method 
in order to examine directly how the intended targets 
of CO2 markets (businesses with CO2-intensive 
production models) interact with CO2 markets, such 
as the European Emissions Trading Scheme. This in-
depth method facilitates a fuller understanding of 
the discrepancies between actual practice and 
intended practice. 
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